at 385 (“Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”). This requirement is intended to limit the municipality's liability to acts for which it is actually responsible, not merely those of its employees. An official policy or custom may take many forms, including “a formally promulgated policy, a well-settled custom or practice, a final decision by a municipal policymaker, or deliberately indifferent training or supervision.” Id. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. We have identified three elements to such a claim: “(1) official policy or custom, (2) causation, and (3) state of mind.” Schneider v. To establish municipal liability on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that “the municipality itself cause the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff “must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts so as to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Serna v. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. “We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, applying the same legal standard as the district court.” Harrison v. It also found that appellants failed to establish that the CCFA's policies or lack of policies caused the alleged abuse.Īppellants argue that the district court erred because the CCFA's lack of institutional control-as evidenced by its failure to supervise employees and enforce polices concerning sexual assault investigations-rose to the level of deliberate indifference and therefore establishes a basis for liability under § 1983. The district court concluded that it could not be because appellants failed to establish deliberate indifference by the administrator of the CCFA, who was the final policymaker for the CCDC. The issue before us is whether the CCFA may potentially be held liable for the alleged abuse. § 1291, we affirm.įor the purpose of this appeal, we accept appellants' contention that their constitutional rights were violated when a detention officer sexually assaulted them or allowed other inmates to sexually assault them. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Comanche County Facilities Authority (“CCFA”), finding there were no disputed genuine issues of material fact as to the CCFA's potential liability for the alleged abuse.
§ 1983 alleging they were sexually abused while in the custody of the Comanche County Detention Center (“CCDC”) in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights.
16-6144 Decided: December 01, 2016īefore TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.Īppellants brought claims under 42 U.S.C. COMANCHE COUNTY FACILITIES AUTHORITY, a/k/a Comanche County Detention Center, d/b/a Comanche County Jail, Defendant - Appellee. NATASHA BLUEBERRY LAMARA GLAZE DANA GRIGGS JESSICA REECE KAREN THRASH, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
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